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It is a standard view among philosophers that an attitude is proposi-
tional if a that clause could represent its content. One way of challeng-
ing this view is to argue that attitudes whose content can be represented 
in that way have categorically different content. A number of authors 
adopted such a strategy and imposed various restrictions on the proposi-
tional attitude class. In this paper, I will argue that such restrictions are 
not tenable because the arguments that are used to support them turn 
against such restrictions as well. As a consequence, if one cannot ad-
equately deal with these arguments from the perspective of the standard 
view, one is forced to discard generally the propositionality of attitudes, 
perhaps even their relational nature. I will consider a strategy for resolv-
ing this challenge in favour of the standard view.
Keywords: Content, facts, propositional attitudes, propositional 
attitude reports, propositions.
1. Introduction
The predominant way in which philosophers from Frege onwards 
thought about attitude reports suggests the semantic thesis that when-
ever a that clause complements an attitude verb, as in the report
(1) Lucy believes that water is not necessarily H2O,
the clause stands for a proposition and the verb for a propositional at-
titude. The reported attitude here would be propositional because it 
has a proposition for its content, namely the proposition that the com-
plement clause picks out. So, to believe that water is not necessarily 
H2O is to believe the proposition that water is not necessarily H2O. 
Abstracting from this particular case leads to the metaphysical thesis 
that (for any agent A and any attitude V) when A V’s that p, A V’s the 
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proposition that p. Since that thesis rests on the idea that at least some 
attitudes are relations between agents and propositions, I will call it 
the proposition thesis. However, exactly which attitudes are proposi-
tional? According to the previous semantic thesis about attitude verbs 
and clausal complements, the answer is attitudes reportable with a 
sentence ⌜A V’s that p⌝. I will call the view that combines the above se-
mantic and metaphysical theses the standard relational view. On this 
view,
(2) John remembers that Putnam was an externalist,
(3) Jane fears that her arguments are inconclusive,
(4) Tracy hopes that internalism is true,
would count as propositional attitude reports, just as (1) and similar 
sentences do, and memory, fear, or hope, just as belief and other re-
lated attitudes, as propositional attitudes.
My paper is a defence of the standard relational view from a family 
of arguments championed by a number of its critics. These arguments 
are supposed to demonstrate that the above semantic and metaphysi-
cal basis of the standard view have consequences suffi ciently problem-
atic to make the view untenable. I think that these arguments can be 
explained away in favour of the standard view. In case they could not, 
I will show that their consequences would be more devastating than 
many of their proponents thought. In section 2, I will set forth the ar-
guments in question. In section 3, I will show how these arguments 
(or their cognates) are as problematic for views of many of their pro-
ponents as they are problematic for proponents of the standard view. 
In section 4, I will propose a strategy for dealing with such arguments 
that supports the standard view. If this strategy is on the right track, it 
eradicates these arguments as valid reasons for any departure from the 
standard view. In case these arguments could not be adequately dealt 
with from the perspective of the standard view, a radical reconsidera-
tion of the semantics of attitude reports and metaphysics of “proposi-
tional” attitudes would be in order.
2. Three arguments
The fi rst argument against the standard relational view runs as 
follows:1 The standard view is committed to truth of the explication 
principle: If a report ⌜A V’s that p⌝ can be explicated as ⌜A V’s the 
proposition that p⌝ without losing the initial meaningfulness, and if 
the two are necessarily equivalent, the attitude for which ⌜V⌝ stands for 
1 Concerning the fi rst argument, its various formulations, and interpretations, 
see Bach (2000b: 120), Harman (2003: 171–172), King (2007: 137–163), McGrath 
(2012: sect. 5), McKinsey (1999: 530), Merricks (2009: 211–215), Moltmann (2013: 
126–132), Prior (1971: 16), Rosefeldt (2008: 304–309), and Schiffer (2003: 92–95; 
2006: 284–286).
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is propositional.2 This principle emerges from the proposition thesis in 
the course of semantic ascent; with it, the metaphysical thesis enters 
the formal mode that allows one to focus on semantic issues. Now, if 
(1)–(4) are propositional attitude reports (as the opening semantic the-
sis alleges) and if the explication principle is true, the reports
(1*) Lucy believes the proposition that water is not necessarily H2O,
(2*) John remembers the proposition that Putnam was an externalist,
(3*) Jane fears the proposition that her arguments are inconclusive,
(4*) Tracy hopes the proposition that internalism is true,
straightforwardly follow. Indeed, (1*)–(4*) should say something true 
whenever their corresponding reports (1)–(4) do. The only difference 
between the corresponding reports resides in expressions that rigidly 
pick out (one and the same) content of an attitude. For example, the 
clause “that water is not necessarily H2O” and the description “the 
proposition that water is not necessarily H2O” both pick out one and 
the same thing—the content of Lucy’s belief. Add to that that a context 
⌜A V’s ___⌝, unlike ⌜A V’s that ____⌝, is extensional,3 and it follows 
that (as the argument is often formulated) substituting ⌜that p⌝ for 
⌜the proposition that p⌝ in ⌜A V’s that p⌝ should not cause the change 
of truth-value or loss of the initial meaningfulness; but sometimes it 
does and that is puzzling. Whereas the corresponding pair (1)/(1*) sat-
isfi es the explication principle because (1) (and belief reports in gen-
eral) can be explicated as (1*) without ever changing its truth-value, 
the remaining pairs do not.
Take the fear report as an example. (3) might say something true 
whereas at the same time and world (3*) might say something false. 
Intuitively, one might fear that p and (at the same time and world) fear 
no proposition or one might fear the proposition that p without fearing 
that p. No doubt, speakers straightforwardly hear the difference be-
tween (3) and (3*); they hear it because these reports say substantially 
different things.4 Add to that a reasonable premise that if anything 
2 I do not think that “explication” here implies synonymy, so, following King 
(2007: 137–140), I set as a condition that the corresponding reports only have to be 
necessarily equivalent. I fi nd it plausible that the clause ⌜that p⌝ and the description 
⌜the proposition that p⌝ function differently. Although they both pick out one and the 
same thing, they make different contributions to propositions that the corresponding 
reports express.
3 One can show that ⌜A V’s ___⌝ is extension and ⌜A V’s that ___⌝ intensional 
by comparing the pair ⌜A believes [that p]⌝ / ⌜A believes [the proposition that p]⌝ 
with the pair ⌜B believes that [A believes that p]⌝ / ⌜B believes that [A believes the 
proposition that p]⌝. Reports in the former pair will always be necessarily equivalent, 
no matter what A knows or believes about propositions. Reports in the latter pair 
will not because B may lack any knowledge about propositions, be unaware of their 
existence, or refuse to grant it. Accordingly, B could have one of these beliefs without 
having the other.
4 Concerning the fear case, see King (2007: 140–141), Merricks (2009: 211–214), 
Moffett (2003: 83), Moltmann (2013: 127–128), Rosefeldt (2008: 304), and Schiffer 
(2003: 93; 2006: 285 n. 31).
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stands for a proposition exclusively and rigidly, it is a description ⌜the 
proposition that p⌝, and it follows that in a report ⌜A fears that p⌝ 
the clause stands for no proposition. Otherwise, the case where ⌜the 
proposition that p⌝ supplants ⌜that p⌝ should not cause any problem. 
However, it does, and so, back at the metaphysical level, one should 
distinguish fearing that p from fearing the proposition that p, which 
shows that fear is never a propositional attitude. The same goes for the 
pair (2)/(2*) and a number of other attitude reports (e.g. reports about 
anticipating, feeling, holding, or judging). As for the pair (4)/(4*), the 
situation seems to be even worse since (4*) is not even a grammatical, 
meaningful construction.5 So, if this argument is conclusive, it supports 
the rejection of the standard relational view because this view identi-
fi es instances of many attitudes as propositional although, the consid-
ered cases show, they never are. At best, given the argument, one could 
say that sometimes V-ing that p comes down to V-ing the proposition 
that p and sometimes it does not. However, that is not the view with 
which we started.6
Some philosophers who embraced the fi rst argument against the 
standard relational view thought that the explication principle it is 
based on could tell us not only which attitudes really are propositional, 
but also identify the appropriate kind of content of attitudes that are 
not propositional, only if one slightly modifi es it. The modifi cation of 
the principle should consist in mentioning a kind of entity other than 
the proposition. Then we could see what attitudes can have it as their 
content. This idea enables one to formulate another argument against 
the standard view but with a positive twist. It would show us not only 
that some “propositional” attitudes are of another kind, but also of 
what kind they are. Here is a popular modifi cation of the explication 
principle concerning factive attitudes:7 If a report ⌜A V’s that p⌝ can be 
explicated as ⌜A V’s the fact that p⌝ without losing the initial meaning-
fulness, and if the two are necessarily equivalent, the attitude for which 
⌜V⌝ stands for is factive. In conjunction with the previous explication 
principle, we could conclude the following. Just as belief would be a 
propositional attitude because (1*) sound fi ne and memory would not 
5 Concerning the hope case, see King (2007: 139, 142–143), Moltmann (2013: 
127–128), Rosefeldt (2008: 306–311), and Schiffer (2003: 92; 2006: 284–285). The 
cases that lead to same consequences include attitudes such as guessing, predicting, 
wishing, or concluding.
6 The same problem would emerge if one would, instead of propositions, talk 
about properties, states of affairs, sets of possible worlds, sentences, utterances, 
statements, mental representations, etc.
7 Concerning this particular modifi cation, see Harman (2003: 171–172), King 
(2007: 149–153; 2014: 64–70), McGrath (2012: sect. 5.4), Moffett (2003: 81–84), 
Moltmann (2013: 128), Parsons (1993: 453–457), Vendler (1972: 112–116; 1979: 223–
229). See also Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971): The general idea is that ⌜V⌝ stands 
for a factive attitude only if ⌜A V’s that p⌝ cannot say something true unless it is 
true that p. By itself, however, this is not enough to establish the thesis about the 
categorical difference in content between factive and non-factive attitudes.
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because (2*) does not capture the point of (2), the latter attitude would 
be factive because
(2#) John remembers the fact that Putnam was an externalist
sounds fi ne, unlike
(1#) Lucy believes the fact that water is not necessarily H2O
that does not capture the point of (1). Of course, one might protest that 
this does not show that memory is not a propositional attitude since 
facts are nothing but true propositions. Such response, however, will 
not do because
(2°) John remembers the true proposition that Putnam was an exter-
nalist
sounds just as bad as (2*).8 Taken together, then, the two arguments 
seems to show that only some of the attitudes that the standard re-
lational view identifi es as propositional really are of the kind, and of 
those that are not, at least some are factive attitudes.9
Finally, to explicitly state the kind of content of an attitude, as with 
the above explication principles, is not the only way to identify an at-
titude (or to discard it) as propositional. Merricks (2009: 214–215) sug-
gested that focusing on features of the content of propositional attitudes 
provides the same result. Propositions are the content of propositional 
attitudes and traditionally they were considered to be abstract enti-
ties. So one should expect that abstract entities are the fi tting content 
of propositional attitudes; attitudes that fail to meet this requirement 
cannot be propositional. The explication principle emerging from this 
observation would be: Whenever a report ⌜A V’s that p⌝ and its gen-
eralised explication ⌜A V’s an abstract entity⌝ are not both meaning-
ful and necessarily equivalent, the attitude for which ⌜V⌝ stands for is 
not propositional. If propositions are essentially abstract, the criterion 
established with this principle seems reasonable. From “Lucy hit Mag-
gie” one can generalise and infer “Lucy hit a girl” without losing the 
initial meaningfulness and truth-value (assuming that Maggie is es-
sentially a girl). Equally so, one should be able to generalise and from 
⌜A V’s that p⌝ infer ⌜A V’s an abstract entity⌝ if what the clause in ⌜A 
V’s that p⌝ stands for is essentially abstract.
8 See Harman (2003: 171), King (2014: 66–68), McGrath (2012: sect. 5.4.), and 
Moffett (2003: 83–84). For a number of arguments for the semantic difference 
between factive and propositional contexts or the metaphysical difference between 
facts and propositions, see Asher (2000: 125–129) and Fine (1982: 46–49).
9 Apparently, one can go still further (see Harman 2003: 173; King 2007: 151; 
McGrath 2012: sect. 5.4; Moffett 2003: 82; and Moltmann 2013: 124–125, 128). 
Attitudes such as fear and imagining fail to satisfy both of the above principles. So 
they are neither propositional nor factive. Nevertheless, they satisfy the principle: If a 
report ⌜A V’s that p⌝ can be explicated as ⌜A V’s the possibility that p⌝ without losing 
the initial meaningfulness, and if the two are necessarily equivalent, the attitude for 
which ⌜V⌝ stands for is “possibilistic”. For example, “Jane fears the possibility that 
her arguments are inconclusive”, unlike (3*), seems to capture the point of (3).
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Some attitudes meet this explication principle. Consider the condi-
tional
(5) when Lucy believes that water is necessarily H2O, she believes 
an abstract entity.
If propositions are contents of beliefs, and if they are essentially ab-
stract entities, the consequent of (5) should be true whenever its an-
tecedent is true. If there could be a case where the antecedent of (5) 
would be true, and its consequent false, belief would not be a proposi-
tional attitude. Intuitively, no such case exists. What about other at-
titudes that the standard relational view identifi es as propositional? 
Consider the conditional
(6) when Jane fears that her arguments are inconclusive, she fears 
an abstract entity.
The same problem that the fi rst argument raised appears again here. 
At the same time and world, the antecedent of (6) could be true and its 
consequent false. In other words, one could fear that p without fearing 
any abstract entity. Furthermore, consider the conditional
(7) when Tracy hopes that internalism is true, she hopes an abstract 
entity.
Unlike the consequent of (6), the consequent of (7) is not even gram-
matical. So, given cases such as (6) or (7), the following conclusion 
seems reasonable: If propositions are essentially abstract entities, fear, 
hope, and a number of other attitudes that the standard relational view 
treats as propositional, are, in fact, not propositional attitudes.10
What should we make of the three considered arguments? If the 
standard relational view is not the right one, as the arguments seem to 
suggest, what is?
3. A slippery slope
Many philosophers expressed dissatisfaction with the standard rela-
tional view, and many of them used the above arguments to support 
their positions. Some of them thought that the metaphysical part of the 
standard view is correct. They saw nothing problematic in the proposi-
tion thesis as long as we put it like this: Only if V is a propositional 
attitude, when A V’s that p, A V’s the proposition that p. Consequently, 
with respect to genuinely propositional attitudes, ⌜A V’s that p⌝ and 
⌜A V’s the proposition that p⌝ would be necessarily equivalent. What 
they found incorrect was the class of attitudes that the standard view 
identifi ed as propositional and to which the proposition thesis was ap-
10 Another feature of propositions that could be exploited here in the same way is 
their objectivity. Also, it is worth noting that propositions are believable, assertable, 
meanable, and rejectable, but not hopable, fearable, or predictable. And “Julie fears 
something assertable (or asserts something fearable)” is not something that we 
would want to infer from “Julie fears and asserts that internalism is wrong”.
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plied. Recall, for proponents of the standard view, that class included 
(at least) every attitude whose instances could be reported with a sen-
tence ⌜A V’s that p⌝. However, arguments of the previous section, if 
conclusive, show that this cannot be the case if the attitudes we are 
in search for have propositions for their content and if their content is 
abstract. According to critics that accept the proposition thesis, only 
some of the attitudes reportable with ⌜A V’s that p⌝ are propositional. 
So the view based on the proposition thesis should be appropriately re-
stricted. One cannot thus straightforwardly read the nature of reported 
attitudes off the surface form of attitude reports. Only if the attitude 
reported with a sentence ⌜A V’s that p⌝ is propositional, the clause 
in the report stands for a proposition. The mere occurrence of a that 
clause in some attitude report cannot guarantee that agent’s proposi-
tional attitude is being reported.11 In this section, I want to show that 
such departures from the standard view are not tenable if one builds 
them on some of the previous arguments. These arguments (or their 
cognates) undermine such restricted views as much as they support 
them and as much as they undermine the standard view.12
If one builds the case for the restriction of the standard relational 
view on the argument that there are factive attitudes that take facts 
rather than (true) propositions for their content, one faces the follow-
ing problem. There are incontestably factive attitudes (e.g. realising, 
being sorry, proud, or glad) whose reports in conjunction with the fact-
mentioning explication principle generate ungrammatical construc-
tions, such as
(8) when John was sorry that Putnam was an externalist, he was 
sorry the fact that Putnam was an externalist.
Also, there are incontestably factive attitudes (e.g. knowledge or notic-
ing and seeing in their non-perceptual sense) whose reports in conjunc-
tion with the same explication principle generate conditionals that are 
not necessarily true, such as
11 In a sense, this would be the reversal of propositionalists’ idea that the fact 
that a that clause does not typically (or at all) occur in a report ⌜A V’s o⌝ (e.g. 
“Sam wants ice-cream” or “Joe desires coffee”) cannot guarantee that a propositional 
attitude is not being reported. Propositionalists think that every attitude report is a 
propositional attitude report (see Grzankowski 2013 for a critical overview).
12 The only version of the restricted relational view that would not be affected 
by the arguments of this and the previous section would be the one that treats as 
propositional only attitudes compatible with the proposition-mentioning explication 
principle. Such restricted view would treat other attitudes in a radically different 
way, not merely by changing the kind of their content. McKinsey (1999: 529) and 
Moltmann (2013: 151) proposed something along these lines. The defence of the 
standard relational view that I discuss in section 4 goes against such views as well. 
If that defence is on the right track, it undermines the very problem of the standard 
view that McKinsey and Moltmann took as the support for their proposal.
24 D. Dožudić, Resisting the Restriction
(9) when Maggie saw that Russell was a realist, she saw the fact 
that Russell was a realist.13
I do not see how “factivists” could deal with this problem except by 
maintaining that the style of argumentation exploited here is somehow 
infelicitous. Thereby, however, they would lose the main support for 
their position. Alternatively, they might grant that such argumenta-
tion is a good one but that it cannot support the factive idea and the 
standard view that would be restricted accordingly. That would, appar-
ently, invite a more radical departure from the standard view. In any 
case, the previously considered support for this particular restricted 
relational view fails.14
Furthermore, we can grant that reports such as (2*)–(4*) show that 
the standard relational view is wrong because some attitudes that it 
identifi es as propositional are not of the kind. If they were, reports 
such as (2*)–(4*) should sound fi ne when derived from (2)–(4). Grant-
ing this, however, still does not put attitudes such as memory, fear, 
and hope, aside as unproblematic for those who want to preserve the 
proposition thesis. Presumably, such philosophers want to defend the 
restricted relational view. But this restricted view should be considered 
(which seems to be inevitable) as part of the larger account of genu-
inely propositional attitudes (such as belief or assertion) and ostensi-
bly propositional attitudes (such as fear or knowledge).15 When they 
restrict the propositional attitude class, the proponents of such a view 
surely do not want to deny that ostensibly propositional attitudes are 
relational states that relate agents to something. However, that some-
thing has to have a category. Also, they cannot deny that at least some 
such attitudes are typically reported with a sentence ⌜A V’s that p⌝. So 
the thing for which the clause in such cases stands for appears not to 
be something “logically simple” (a particular or an attribute). It must 
13 For this point see Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 348), McGrath (2012: sect. 
5.3), Moltmann (2013: 87, 128, 131, 144), Parsons (1993: 459 n. 14), and Rosefeldt 
(2008: 304). On the other hand, Harman (2003) and Moffett (2003) see nothing 
problematic in reports such as “Mary knows/realises the fact that three is even”. 
Apparently, intuitions about meaningfulness and other semantic features of such 
reports vary. For example, Moltmann (2013: 124–125, 151) suggests that in the case 
of noticing, (8) would be acceptable. At one point, however, she suggests that it would 
not (2013: 128). To my ear, one could notice the fact that p (if facts are a kind of thing 
that one could notice in the fi rst place) without noticing that p (or vice versa). The 
noun phrase here seems to trigger a different, perceptual reading of “notice”, as in 
“Maggie noticed a strange man in the corner”. Notice, by the way, that this report 
differs from “Maggie noticed that there is a strange man in the corner”. The former 
one might say something true even when the latter one does not.
14 For an additional argument against this version of the relational view, see 
Williamson (2000: 43).
15 As I have already said, the only two exceptions that I am aware of would 
be McKinsey (1999) and Moltmann (2013). McKinsey would deny that ostensibly 
propositional attitudes are relational and Moltmann that they are relations to a 
single, proposition-like entity.
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be something complex and structured, such as a fact, state of affairs, 
event, possibility, etc. In other words, some attitudes that would not be 
propositional would be objectual, such as loving (philosophy) or fearing 
(dogs). Other such attitudes would be non-objectual, e.g. fearing (that a 
dog will bite me) or hoping (that a dog will not bite me). All genuinely 
propositional attitudes would be non-objectual too. Moreover, whatever 
the kind of the content of non-objectual instances of ostensibly propo-
sitional attitudes would be, it seems mandatory for proponents of the 
restricted relational view to introduce the analogue of the proposition 
thesis for them.
In that case, the restricted relational view should be understood 
as part of the generalised relational view concerning non-objectual at-
titudes. That view would be based on the thesis that for any attitude V 
(reportable with a sentence ⌜A V’s that p⌝), when A V’s that p, A V’s the F 
that p (where “F” stands for whatever kind of complex entity one takes 
to be the proper content of an attitude in question). However, how can 
one instantiate this thesis for ostensibly propositional attitudes that do 
not satisfy the initial explication principle? Is the content of such atti-
tudes of a single kind F or should one expect variations in kind? To an-
swer the latter question, one would have to pair every ostensibly propo-
sitional attitude V with a kind F to which its content belongs. In the 
previous section, I have mentioned two such candidates—the category 
of facts and the category of possibilities. However, there are ostensibly 
propositional attitudes that are neither factive nor “possibilistic”. So 
what about them? Perhaps we could pair some of these attitudes with 
the appropriate explication principle (I am unaware of any such ex-
ample). Nevertheless, we would still be left with the class of attitudes 
for which we could never appropriately instantiate the schema ⌜when 
A V’s that p, A V’s the F that p⌝. There would be no instances of the 
schema that are necessarily true. To support the generalised relational 
view, however, one would have to fi nd, for every attitude report, some 
kind F that would make instances of the schema true.
As King (2007: 139, 142) and Schiffer (2003: 93; 2006: 285, 292) 
point out, any attitude verb that cannot be grammatically combined 
with a description ⌜the proposition that p⌝ (e.g. “complain”, “hope”, or 
“surprise”), cannot be combined with any other description (and most 
other noun phrases). For example, no matter how the conditional
(10) when Tracy hopes that internalism is true, she hopes the ___
is fi lled out, the result will be some ungrammatical construction. More 
interestingly, King (2007: 150–151) mentions cases, such as feeling, 
hearing, and indicating, for which the schema ⌜when A V’s that p, A 
V’s the F that p⌝ can be meaningfully (and so grammatically) instanti-
ated. However, no matter what category we identify F with here, the 
resulting conditional will never be necessarily true. There will always 
be a world where e.g. Peg felt that Frege was wrong but where at the 
same time she did not felt the ___ (fi ll the blank at will). In that case, 
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the content of her feeling would be of no (explicable) kind F. That is 
clearly not an epistemological problem of not knowing the kind of the 
appropriate content of feeling (or other similar attitudes). The problem 
is a metaphysical one. No kind could in principle be identifi ed as the 
kind of content of attitudes in question. Indeed, we could not even iden-
tify the content of attitudes in question as such-and-such content. All 
this is implausible; something has gone wrong.
The fi rst two arguments against the standard relational view 
(namely, arguments based on the proposition and the fact mentioning 
explication principles) are clearly nonstarters if one wants to preserve 
the proposition thesis. Let us now follow the logic of the third argu-
ment.
If an entity is not abstract, it is reasonable to assume that it is con-
crete. So if fear, hope, memory, feeling, etc., are still considered to be 
relational states, it follows that when one fears that p, one fears some-
thing. Moreover, if that something is not abstract, it must be a concrete 
entity. From that it follows, for example,
(6*) when Jane fears that her arguments are inconclusive, she fears 
a concrete entity.
However, if one derives it from “Jane fears that her arguments are 
inconclusive”, the report “Jane fears a concrete entity” seems just as 
problematic as “Jane fears an abstract entity”. There will always be a 
world where Jane fears that her arguments are inconclusive and where 
at the same time she fears no abstract or concrete entity. Also,
(7*) when Tracy hopes that internalism is true, she hopes a concrete 
entity
is as ungrammatical as (7).16 In that case, the mere removal of atti-
tudes such as fear or hope from the propositional attitude class, even if 
it resolves the letter of the initial problem, cannot resolve its spirit.
The arguments considered in this section resemble in style argu-
ments of the previous section. So, anyone who grants the former style 
of argumentation seems to be obliged to accept the latter arguments 
as well. Otherwise, one would have to deny that seeing is (sometimes) 
a factive attitude, that the abstract/concrete distinction exhausts the 
domain of entities, that some attitudes have content of some explicable 
kind, and even then one would not solve all the problems indicated 
here. If so, one should not understand the opening arguments against 
the standard relational view in the way that some of their proponents 
16 Furthermore, even if contents of various non-objectual attitudes categorically 
differ, each particular content of such attitudes is an entity. But explicating ⌜A V’s 
that p⌝ as, for example, ⌜A V’s the entity that the clause in wx at tx stands for⌝ turns 
out to be as problematic for a number of attitudes as explicating it as ⌜A V’s the 
proposition that p⌝. The same goes for the generalisations ⌜A V’s an entity⌝ or ⌜A 
V’s entities⌝ (for similar examples see Moltmann 2013: 128 and Rosefeldt 2008: 311, 
316). Should we take this as evidence that what a clause ⌜that p⌝ stands for is not an 
entity? If we want to preserve the generalised relational view, we should not.
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have recommended. It is not just a particular kind or nature of the 
entity that “propositional” attitudes take as their content that is at 
stake, but the relational nature of such attitudes as well. Philosophers 
who were in the light of the previous arguments proposing more radical 
departures from the standard relational view precisely argued that not 
only do we need a different semantic analysis of “propositional” attitude 
reports, but also a different metaphysical thesis. Whatever they are, 
“propositional” attitudes are not relations between agents and prop-
ositions (or even proposition-like entities).17 This could further mean 
one of the two things. Either no attitude that the standard relational 
view identifi es as propositional would be something that relates agents 
to propositions/proposition-like entities or no such attitude would be 
something that relates in the fi rst place.
4. A way out
If the considered arguments constitute a genuine problem, they do it 
for any version of the relational view. The moral of the two previous 
sections was either that there is something wrong with drawing meta-
physical lessons from considerations based on the explication prin-
17 One referee objected here that I have disregarded Bach’s (2000b) semantics 
for propositional attitude reports. That semantic analysis rests on the idea that in 
attitude reports “that”-clauses merely indefi nitely describe rather than specify the 
content of reported attitudes. Bach (2000b: 120) takes the fi rst argument of section 
2 to be a “striking linguistic evidence” against the standard relational view and a 
support for his modifi ed relational view. I think that his and similar views suffer the 
same problem (Dožudić 2013: 103–104). Firstly, Bach does not specify the kind of 
content of “propositional” attitudes. All he says about it is: “since it is not clear what 
these ‘things’ are, I am reluctant to call them ‘propositions’” (Bach 2000b: 122). (He 
conveniently ends another paper defending the same conception with the remark: 
“What, then, are belief contents, such that their contents can’t be specifi ed fully by 
‘that’-clauses, and how can belief contents be specifi ed fully? Now that’s a puzzle.” 
(Bach 2000a: 108).) However, as soon as his view would be metaphysically completed 
in that respect—as soon as one would identify the kind of attitude’s content—the 
same “striking linguistic evidence” would undermine it as well. Recall, one could 
never appropriately instantiate the schema ⌜when A V’s that p, A V’s the F that p⌝ 
for a number of “propositional” attitudes. Secondly, whatever the kind of the content 
of “propositional” attitudes on Bach’s view would be, the view would face the third 
argument of section 2 (or its cognates from this section). Bach’s content of attitudes 
would surely be something abstract or concrete, objective or subjective, something 
believable or assertable, etc. Also, “that”-clauses are surely not the only devices that 
enable us to describe attitude’s content indefi nitely. So Bach would have to cope 
with reports such as “Garry hopes something abstract” or “Lucy fears a believable/
fearable thing”. Finally, Bach’s argument that “that”-clauses do not specify attitude’s 
content does not show that such clauses do not specify something outside attitude 
contexts. In fact, Bach (2000b: 132) allows that “that”-clauses function differently 
within and outside attitude reports, and suggests that such clauses do specify 
the relevant content outside such reports. However, the same “striking linguistic 
evidence” undermines that idea. We face problems analogous to those of pairs (2)/
(2*) or (4)/(4*) in other contexts where “that”-clauses occur (see Rosefeldt 2008: 306 
and Schiffer 2003: 93 for several such examples).
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ciples (and so that there was no serious problem with the standard 
relational view in the fi rst place) or that “propositional” attitudes are 
plainly not propositional (including proposition-like entities here too) 
and relational. In the latter case, a version of the adverbial, multiple-
relational, or paratactic analysis of attitude reports would be in order. 
How one will resolve this dilemma depends on how one understands 
the previous arguments. I think that there are compelling reasons for 
thinking that so far considered criticism of the standard relational view 
(including its restricted versions) does not constitute a substantial, let 
alone decisive problem for it. Accordingly, this criticism would not call 
for some alternative analysis.
All arguments considered so far manifest the same style of argu-
mentation. In fact we should treat them as exemplifi cations of one and 
the same phenomenon that I will call the explication problem. In out-
line, the problem is the following: According to the standard relational 
view, in a report ⌜A V’s that p⌝, ⌜A⌝ stands for an agent, ⌜V⌝ for an 
attitude by which the agent is related to its content, and ⌜that p⌝ for 
the proposition that p—the abstract, objective, content of V. However, 
explicating numerous instances of ⌜A V’s that p⌝ by stating the kind or 
the nature of their content in accordance with the standard view (what 
in practice means replacing ⌜that p⌝ in such reports for a noun phrase) 
results either in ungrammatical constructions or in reports that have 
substantially changed meaning and truth conditions. And all this hap-
pens although ⌜A V’s ___⌝ is an extensional context, and ⌜that p⌝ and 
the corresponding noun phrases, such as ⌜the proposition that p⌝ or 
⌜an abstract entity⌝, rigidly designate or apply to one and the same 
thing.18 Now, if one could adequately explain this problem in a way that 
is compatible with the standard view, any criticism of that view that 
exploits it would fail. Here, I will consider one strategy of dealing with 
the explication problem that, I think, vindicates the standard relation-
al view. It comes down to a slight rephrasing of the proposition thesis.
Here is a motivation for this strategy: Some philosophers have ar-
gued that there were a number of category mistakes related to prin-
ciples of causation. In principles such as if E causes F and F causes 
G, then E causes G the subject and the object of the cause, according 
to them, are of different categories (namely, facts and events). If so, 
entities that cause (namely, facts) could not be caused entities (name-
ly, events). In discussing such category mistakes, Harman (2003: 168) 
18 See the opening paragraph of section 2 for further clarifi cations of the 
explication problem. This problem is usually called the “substitution” or “substitution 
failure” problem (cf. King 2007, McGrath 2012, Moltmann 2013, and Schiffer 2003, 
2006). In order to avoid confusing it with the more familiar substitution failure 
problem concerning the substitution of coreferential names in attitude reports, I 
prefer a different name. Also, I think that talk of substitution here might mislead 
one to think that the problem substantially depends on substituting descriptions 
for clauses (which, from the Russellian point, is quite controversial). That is not the 
case, so I adopt a more neutral talk in terms of explication.
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in passing mentions a potential way out of the problem for those who 
think that causes and effects are of the same category. The idea is that 
one “might replace statements using the verb cause with statements 
using is a cause of, (causally) leads to, or is (causally) responsible for. 
Or, statements of the form E causes F are replaced by statements using 
constructions like F is an effect of E, F is a result of E, or F is a conse-
quence of E”. Such rephrasing of the initial sentence “E causes F” would 
make the category mistakes illusory and metaphysically irrelevant be-
cause it would expose them as the consequence of the particular formu-
lation of a causal principle, not the principle itself.
It seems that we could adopt the analogous strategy in dealing with 
the explication problem. Prima facie, the strategy works. All that we 
need to do is rephrase the proposition thesis.19 Initially, the thesis was 
put like this: When A V’s that p, A V’s the proposition that p. It was this 
formulation that led into the explication problem. Nevertheless, if that 
problem is a genuine one for the standard relational view, it should 
persist no matter how the proposition thesis is being rephrased (just as 
e.g. the Gettier problem persists however we rephrase the three tradi-
tional conditions for knowledge). However, as it turns out, it does not. 
Here is a rephrasing of the proposition thesis that in no way affects the 
originally intended metaphysical point but that bypasses problems dis-
cussed in previous two sections: (For any agent A and any attitude V) 
when A V’s that p, A stands in (or bears) the V relation to the proposition 
that p.20 Indeed, one may argue that the proposition thesis as initially 
formulated was nothing but a shortened statement of this alternative 
formulation. This would make sense because the rephrased proposition 
thesis, unlike the initial one, provides a fuller analysis of what it means 
to V that p. To wit, it explicates not only the kind of the content of V, but 
also V’s relational nature. I seriously doubt that anyone who grants the 
initial proposition thesis would deny that rephrasing in this way adds 
anything unintended.21
Furthermore, the initial proposition thesis, strictly speaking, does 
not commit one to any particular view of propositions. So it would still 
19 Although here I talk about rephrasing the thesis, I mean rephrasing the 
formulation of the thesis. In the course of rephrasing the thesis itself should remain 
the same.
20 Philosophers discussing the standard relational view occasionally do use 
constructions such as “stands in (or bears) the belief relation to the proposition” (cf. 
Fodor as cited in Bach 2000b, King 2007, McGrath 2012, McKinsey 1999, Merricks 
2009, Rosefeldt 2008, Schiffer 2006). Such constructions come as a natural way of 
formulating the basic idea of the view.
21 Perhaps we should not be surprised that supplanting a clause ⌜that p⌝ with 
a description ⌜the proposition that p⌝, that is of an entirely different grammatical 
category, at least sometimes requires adjustments to a context ⌜A V’s ___⌝. The 
situation is similar in the case of supplanting a predicate with the corresponding 
abstract noun. For example, when supplanting the predicate “red” in “This car is 
red” with “redness”, “This car is ___” becomes “This car instantiates (or participates 
in) ___”. Otherwise, the sentence would be false.
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be possible to subject that thesis to the adverbial interpretation (cf. 
Quine 1960: 216 and Prior 1971: 18–21), rather than take it as some-
thing that is not compatible with such interpretation. For proponents 
of the adverbial analysis, that would be mandatory. They certainly 
need to explain reports such as ⌜A V’s the proposition that p⌝ or ⌜A 
V’s the fact that p⌝ that are (at least the latter one) used even outside 
technical philosophical discussions (just as nominalists have to explain 
the explicit reference to universals). Therefore, instead of denying the 
truth evaluability or even the meaningfulness of such reports, they 
could accommodate them on their terms. Accordingly, a proponent of 
the adverbial analysis might construe ⌜V’s the proposition/fact that⌝ 
as a functor that connects a singular term ⌜A⌝ and a sentence ⌜p⌝ 
that is here called a “proposition” or “fact” but interpreted as an entity 
compatible with the adverbial analysis, just as one can construe ⌜V’s 
that⌝ that way. That was in a way Quine’s (1995: 77) idea: “There is 
indeed a usage of ‘proposition’ that is useful and unobjectionable. It can 
be construed as denoting the sentences themselves, rather than their 
meanings, but it is used instead of ‘sentence’ when we are concerned 
with the sentence as an object of belief […] rather then with its mor-
phology and syntax.”22 My rephrasing of the proposition thesis in prin-
ciple precludes such an analysis since it replaces the original attitude 
verb with a phrase ⌜stands in the V relation to⌝. So the proponents of 
the standard relational views should prefer it to the initial proposition 
thesis.
If one takes the rephrased proposition thesis as the basis for the 
standard relational view, the arguments of previous sections, i.e. the 
explication problem, in no way affects it. There is nothing strange in 
saying e.g. that Jane stands in the fear or hope relation to the proposi-
tion that internalism is true when she fears or hopes that internalism 
is true. Also, there is nothing strange in saying that she stands in the 
fear or hope relation to an abstract entity when she fears or hopes what 
she does. Moreover, instead of propositions, any other kind of entity 
(concrete or abstract) could prima facie be identifi ed via the rephrased 
proposition thesis as the content of V. There is nothing in the very 
formulation of that thesis that prevents this. For me, that is its virtue. 
One should make the choice of the appropriate kind of content of V on 
metaphysical (or at least non-linguistic) grounds. Anyone who accepts 
the explication problem (the list includes most of the authors mentioned 
in footnotes 1, 4–5, and 7–9) seems to be obliged to explain why that 
problem would undermine the standard relational view even though 
the rephrased proposition thesis generates reports that make perfect 
sense for any attitude standardly treated as propositional, namely for 
any attitude reportable with a sentence ⌜A V’s that p⌝. In fact, I would 
22 Of course, proponents of the adverbial analysis would not talk about 
“propositions” or “facts” as objects of attitudes. They might say instead that 
“propositions” and “facts” are sentences on which a ⌜V’s that⌝ operates, or that they 
are merely grammatical objects connected with attitude verbs.
 D. Dožudić, Resisting the Restriction 31
say that it is far from clear to what extent the explication problem 
undermines the standard view in the fi rst place. It is legitimate to won-
der who bears the burden of proof here, the proponents of the proposi-
tion thesis who need to deal with problematic cases, such (2*)–(4*) and 
(6)–(7), or their opponents who need to deal with unproblematic cases, 
such as (1) or (5). We would certainly need an additional argument that 
favours one standpoint over the other.
In response, one might object to the rephrasing of the proposition 
thesis in the following way. Although ⌜that p⌝ and ⌜the proposition 
that p⌝ are rigidly codesignative expressions, one cannot infer the re-
port ⌜A stands in the V relation to that p⌝ from the report ⌜A stands 
in the V relation to the proposition that p⌝. Such an inference would be 
meaningless, and it would be meaningless for any V. Then, the conclu-
sion would be that the rephrased proposition thesis faces consequences 
that are as problematic as those that the initial proposition thesis has 
faced after all. However, I do not think that would be a problem for 
the proposed rephrasing. There is a straightforward explanation of the 
meaninglessness of a conditional ⌜when A stands in the V relation to 
the proposition that p, A stands in the V relation to that p⌝. The con-
ditional is meaningless because its consequent is meaningless, and the 
consequent is meaningless because it is ungrammatical. It is easy to 
explain why. It is ungrammatical because in English “that”-clauses 
cannot follow prepositions; only noun phrases can. There is no mystery 
here, and so no problem for the rephrased proposition thesis.23
Finally, there seems to be a cross-linguistic reason to prefer the re-
phrased proposition thesis to the initial one. One cannot literally trans-
late the initial proposition thesis into a number of languages (Slavic 
languages are a good example). One can translate its rephrased ver-
sion. So the rephrased proposition thesis should be preferred to the ini-
tial one, at least if metaphysical points we want to make should exceed 
English or a restricted class of languages.
23 One referee (a native English speaker) objected that (s)he sees no problem in 
combining prepositions with “that”-clauses and that, consequently, there is nothing 
problematic in a construction ⌜A stands in the V relation to that p⌝. If that were 
the case, I would have one less problem to worry about, but I am not so sure about 
that. To wit, I am not a native English speaker, but English grammar books seems 
to agree that “that”-clauses cannot follow prepositions in grammatical constructions 
(see Downing and Locke 2006: 104, 536; and Eastwood 1994: 287, 344). Of course, 
to some degree one could ignore English grammar in order to deliver a point using 
ungrammatical constructions. Philosophers sometimes do that. In that case, 
however, one could not at the same time appeal to the explication problem to make 
any point since that problem heavily depends on English grammar. If, however, 
one decides to take grammar seriously, the only ways I can hear a construction 
⌜A stands in the V relation to that p⌝ as grammatical and meaningful is either by 
taking ⌜that p⌝ as a complex demonstrative not as a clause or by assuming that 
⌜that p⌝ is capitalised or altered with another convention for which one stipulates 
that it transforms expressions into names of their contents (that would allow one to 
say things such as ⌜THAT P is structured and abstract⌝).
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5. Concluding remarks
Suppose that we can describe one and the same state of affairs in (at 
least slightly) different ways. Suppose further that some (but not all) 
of these descriptions sometimes lead into problems that are primar-
ily caused by their syntactic features. What is the proper reaction to 
that? Should we deny that some state of affairs that actually obtains 
is ever being described with any of these descriptions? Should we con-
clude that some of the competing descriptions are just not adequate for 
making certain (or any relevant) points? I am inclined to side with the 
latter option. In fact, as the previous section shows, I think that one 
could discard the explication problem along that line. There are ways to 
express basic ideas of the standard relational view that the explication 
problem does not affect. This possibility, of course, does not explain the 
phenomena that enabled the formulation of the explication problem in 
the fi rst place. However, I do not think that this is important for pres-
ent purposes. Whatever the ultimate explanation of this phenomena is, 
we can expect that it will at the same time be the explanation of why 
the original formulation of the proposition thesis is problematic and 
the rephrased one is not.
There is, however, an additional worry one might have concerning 
the rephrased proposition thesis, and it runs as follows:24 The thesis 
when A stands in the V relation to the proposition that p, A V’s the 
proposition that p seems to be just as good as the rephrased proposition 
thesis that I was defending, namely when A V’s that p, A stands in the 
V relation to the proposition that p. Indeed, anyone who accepts the lat-
ter one seems to be obliged to accept the former one as well. If so, then 
the rephrased proposition thesis does not provide a desired way out of 
the problems with the initial proposition thesis discusses in section 2. 
A report ⌜A stands in the V relation to the proposition that p⌝ might 
say something true and at the same time and world the corresponding 
report ⌜A V’s the proposition that p⌝ might say something meaningless 
or false. I think that we can avoid this problem.
Consider the two reports that make the formulation of the rephrased 
proposition thesis, namely ⌜A V’s that p⌝ and ⌜A stands in the V rela-
tion to the proposition that p⌝. Although they (by my assumption) re-
port or describe one and the same state of affairs, they do it by express-
ing different propositions. They express different propositions at least 
because the expressions ⌜V⌝ and ⌜stands in the V relation to⌝ make 
different contributions to propositions that the corresponding reports 
express.25 Now, we may construe the rephrased proposition thesis as 
an inference, namely
(11) A V’s that p; so A stands in the V relation to the proposition that 
p.
24 One of the referees for the journal raised this worry.
25 I would say the same for ⌜that p⌝ and ⌜the proposition that p⌝; see note 2.
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As it stands, however, that inference is incomplete. Some premises es-
sential to reach the conclusion are missing here. The inference “Cicero 
is Roman; so Tully is Roman” is incomplete as long as the premise “Cic-
ero = Tully” is missing. Equally so, (11) is incomplete until one adds the 
premises ⌜that p = the proposition that p⌝ and ⌜to V = to stand in the 
V relation to⌝.26 Accordingly, the complete form of the above inference 
would be
(11*) A V’s that p, ⌜that p⌝ and ⌜the proposition that p⌝ stand for the 
same thing, ⌜V⌝ and ⌜stands in the V relation to⌝ stand for the 
same thing; so A stands in the V relation to the proposition that 
p.
If the three premises are true, the conclusion must be true as well; 
(11*) is a valid inference.
Similarly, we may construe the problematic thesis when A stands in 
the V relation to the proposition that p, A V’s the proposition that p as 
an inference, namely
(12) A stands in the V relation to the proposition that p; so A V’s the 
proposition that p.
If (12) is valid, its conclusion should be true whenever its premise is 
true. However (and this is the apparent problem), the conclusion might 
be false although the premise is true. So the inference seems not to 
be valid after all. If this inference is not valid, the standard relational 
view cannot be correct. Notice, however, that (12), just as (11), is an 
incomplete inference as long as the premise ⌜to V = to stand in the V 
relation to⌝ is missing. The complete inference form of (12) would be
(12*) A stands in the V relation to the proposition that p, ⌜stands in 
the V relation to⌝ and ⌜V⌝ stand for the same thing; so A V’s the 
proposition that p.
Again, if (12*) is valid, the conclusion should be true whenever the 
premises are. However, if one should construe the problematic thesis 
as (12*) rather than (12), how does it represent a threat to the standard 
view? Assume that in (12*) the report ⌜A stands in the V relation to 
the proposition that p⌝ says something true and ⌜A V’s the proposi-
tion that p⌝ something meaningless or false. Is that a problem for the 
standard view? I think that it is not. If the conclusion in (12*) is mean-
ingless, it is such because it is not grammatical, and it is not grammati-
cal because noun phrases cannot follow some attitude verbs (see King 
2007: 139 and 142).
What if the conclusion in (12*) is meaningful but false? That could 
mean one of the two things. Either all the premises are true and the 
26 Of course, to make any sense of the premises so formulated we would have to 
adopt a convention that I have mentioned at the end of the note 23. I will disregard it 
here. Instead, for simplicity sake, I will use metalinguistic formulations. Also, I will 
ignore here general tacit assumptions, such as the one that the same expressions 
within a sentence stand for the same thing unless it is differently stated.
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inference is invalid or a premise is false and the inference is valid 
but unsatisfi ed. The former option straightforwardly undermines the 
standard view and the latter one does not. So all that one need to do in 
order to save the standard view here is to show that a premise in (12*) 
might be false. By stipulation, the premise ⌜A stands in the V relation 
to the proposition that p⌝ says something true. So the only suspect here 
could be the premise “⌜stands in the V relation to⌝ and ⌜V⌝ stand for 
the same thing”. Could this premise be false although the proposition 
thesis, (11), or (11*), are true? I think that it could.
Let us return to the previous fear case in which we had two corre-
sponding reports, namely (3) and (3*), of which one could be false and 
at the same time and world the other one true. If we carefully observe 
(3) and (3*), we can notice that, intuitively, different relations towards 
one and the same thing are being reported. In that case, the verb “fear” 
must be ambiguous in the sense that it picks out different relations. 
Accordingly, “stands in the fear relation to” must be ambiguous in the 
same sense too. If so, the premise “⌜stands in the V relation to⌝ and 
⌜V⌝ stand for the same thing” could be false whenever ⌜V⌝ is ambigu-
ous in the above sense. In such cases, expressions ⌜stands in the V 
relation to⌝ and ⌜V⌝ would stand for different relations. That seems to 
be precisely the case with problematic instances of (12*).
If we start with the true report “Jane fears that her arguments are 
inconclusive”, infer via (11*) the report “Jane stands in the fear relation 
to the proposition that her arguments are inconclusive”, and then from 
it infer via (12*) the report “Jane fears the proposition that her argu-
ments are inconclusive”, this chain of inferences would be invalid. The 
reason is that throughout this chain of inferences the verb “fear” does 
not stand for the same relation. As King (2007: 153–159) has argued, 
when combined with verbs such as “fear” or “desire”, noun phrases trig-
ger different readings of such verbs than clauses do, making them pick 
out different attitude relations.
By itself, then, (12*) will be valid for any attitude whose representa-
tive verb does not turn it into an ungrammatical constructions. How-
ever, only for some such attitudes the validity will remain when (12*) 
is combined with (11*). This is something that in no way undermines 
the standard relational view.27
27 I presented parts of this paper at the Mental Phenomena: Philosophy of 
Linguistics conference in Dubrovnik, September 2012, and at the Mind, Language, 
and Action conference in Kirchberg am Wechsel, August 2013. I am grateful to 
participants at the conferences for encouraging feedback. Also, I am grateful to Ana 
Butković and Klara Bilić Meštrić for reading an earlier draft and providing valuable 
comments. Comments and suggestions provided by anonymous referees for the 
journal were of much help as well.
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